Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 177) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 235) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

A judge may, however, instruct both litigants to speak concisely.

For the manner in which a person is dressed creates an impression and influences the way a judge will look at the case. Moreover, this may cause the litigant who is poorly dressed to be disconcerted and prevent him from presenting his arguments articulately (Rashi, Sh’vuot 31a).
The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:2 states that when there is not a radical difference in the litigants’ manner of dress, even though one’s clothes are more elegant than the other’s, there is no necessity for the court to equate them entirely. The Siftei Cohen 17:2 extends this principle, stating that at present, since it is not customary for anyone to wear the extremely expensive clothing that some wore in the Talmudic age, this law is not practiced.

For this would indicate favoritism.

As indicated by Deuteronomy 19:17: “And the two men who have the dispute shall stand before God.”

This is the custom at present, as stated in Halachah 5.

The license to sit.

The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:5 states that after the fact, if the witnesses sit, their, testimony is not invalidated. Moreover, he cites authorities who maintain that even at the outset, the requirement applies only to judges who possess semichah. Before judges of the present era, the litigants may sit.

Although literally, the verse is speaking about the litigants, Sh’vuot 30a states that the words “who have the dispute” refer to the litigants. Who then are “the two men”? The witnesses.

For it is a mitzvah to show deference to a Torah scholar (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:1).

So that they appear equal.

For everyone realizes that the scholar is given this respect in appreciation of his scholarship. That does not necessarily mean that the judges will favor him in judgment.

For it will appear that he told him his perspective concerning the dispute. See also Halachah 7.

Our translation follows the version found in the manuscripts and early printings of the Mishneh Torah. The standard published text has a slightly different version.

For it is obvious that he came at the time he usually comes and not to provide him with information concerning the dispute.

We have left the term in its Hebrew original in which instance, it connotes Talmudic academies, i.e., the courts sanctioned by all the Talmudic academies. It could, however, be interpreted as meaning "settlements," i.e., throughout the international Jewish community, this practice was accepted.

I.e., common people might begin arguing if they were asked to stand. The Siftei Cohen 17:7 quotes the Bayit Chadash who states that although this dispensation is granted, it is proper for the litigants and the witnesses not to accept it and stand when delivering testimony.

I.e., the sequence of the verse implies the order of precedence.

Since widows have experienced grief and suffering, their spirits are weak and we undertake this and other measures to alleviate their anguish.

This is one of the expressions of deference for Torah scholars, as stated in Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:10.

Yevamot 100a states that women are rarely involved in judicial disputes and hence, having to appear in court would be very embarrassing. Kina’at Eliyahu questions if the changes in the socio-economic norms and the wider role women have in society today would cause this ruling to be altered.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 15:2 quotes these principles. It also states (loc. cit.:1) that generally a judge should hear the cases in the order that the litigants appear in court.

For in this way, the other litigant can challenge the statement if he maintains that it is false. Moreover, we assume that a person will have greater difficulty lying in the presence of the person he is trying to mistreat.

The Rambam’s apparent source is the Zohar, Vol. I, p. 179b. This is significant, because there are questions whether or not he was ever exposed to the teachings of the Kabbalah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 281) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 74) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See Halachah 10, and see Chapter 22, Halachot 2-3. This warning is also applied to judges, see Chapter 23, Halachah 10, and Chapter 24, Halachah 3.

For the judge must hear the words of the litigants and the witnesses [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 28:6)] directly. See the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:14 who states that at present, leniency is taken in this regard and it has become customary for litigants to give others power of attorney to argue their cases.

This clarifies that he understood them correctly. Implied is that he should restate their statements in their presence, so that they can correct him if he errs (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:15).

Saying “He appears to have made a proper argument” or the like (Kessef Mishneh).

Our translation is based on the interpretation of the Sefer Me’irat Einayim 17:18.

Avot 1:8 states: “Do not accept the role of a counselor.” In his commentary to that mishnah, the Rambam writes:
One should not advise a litigant to assert a claim that will benefit him or [teach him] to defend himself... This applies even when [the judge] knows that he is being exploited and that the other litigant is making a false claim. It is, nevertheless, forbidden to teach [the litigant] a claim that will advance his interests.
As explained in the next halachah and notes, there is room for leniency in certain situations. Nevertheless, this is the general rule.

The Tur (Choshen Mishpat 17) differs with the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that a judge can take greater leniency and advise a litigant with regard to a just claim. In that vein, he cites the example of Rav Huna stated by the Jerusalem Talmud who would offer assistance when he saw a litigant who did not know how to state his claims.
Ketubot 52b cites an example of Rabbi Yochanan who did offer such assistance to a litigant, but then regretted it stating: “I have conducted myself like a legal counselor.” The Rambam himself states in Hilchot Shemitah ViYovel 9:24: “When a creditor brings the promissory note... we tell the defendant: ‘Pay him.’ If the defendant protests: ‘Where is your pruzbol?’ [The judge] may ask the plaintiff: ‘Did you have a pruzbol and lose it?’”
The issue is a very delicate one and the Rabbis (see the Sefer Me’irat Einryim 17:19 and the Turei Zahav) have debated it extensively. Ultimately, as the Rambam states, every judge must employ his own discretion.