Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 210) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 33) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 211) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 212) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

See the Jerusalem Talmud, Pe’ah 1:1, which explains that the honor one is required to show one’s parents exceeds that which one is required to show God, as it were (Radbaz).

Kiddushin 31 a states that a child has a tendency to honor his mother more than his father. Therefore, his father is mentioned first with regard to this mitzvah. And his tendency is to fear his father more, so with regard to that mitzvah, his mother is given first mention.

I.e., taking his position in the place where elders usually stand and take counsel with each other. Alternatively, it refers to standing in his place in the synagogue [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:2)].

I.e., the place where he dines at home.

Our translation is based on a responsun of the Rambam (Responsum 264). Others render the term as supporting his words. For supporting his father’s decision implies that his support enhances his father’s words. That is a mark of disrespect.
When quoting this law, the Shulchan Aruch (op. cit.) mentions that this applies in his father’s presence. For that is a mark of disrespect. Outside his father’s presence, he may differ with him or justify his father’s opinion. It would appear that the Rambam himself would accept this distinction, because we find that he did express different halachic opinions than his father. See Hilchot Shechitah 11:10.
This presumption is borne out by the Rambam’s ruling in Hilchot Talmud Torah 5:6 where he states that a person may not contradict or support the words of his teacher “in his presence.”

This is indeed the manner in which the Rambam refers to his father in Hilchot Shechitah, loc. cit. The Radbaz states that if a person refers to his father as Rabbi Abraham or the like, it is acceptable.

For others might think that he is referring to his father, and that will compromise his father’s honor (Radbaz).
Tosafot Rabbenu Asher (Horiot 14a) gives an example of this concept. The Sage Rabbah raised the Sage Abbaye who was his nephew. The name Abbaye was actually coined by Rabbah because Abbaye shared the same name as Rabbah’s own father. Indeed, that factor is indicated by the name itself. For Abbaye is an Aramaic derivative of the Hebrew Avi, meaning “my father.” Ravva, Abbaye’s colleague, by contrast, did not refer to him as Abbaye, but instead called him by his given name: Nachmeini.

It would appear that within his father’s presence, this is forbidden.

Implied is that the son does not have to use his own resources to provide for his parents.

I.e., the court may use physical force to compel him to provide for them.

I.e., he is compelled to sustain them from the money that he would donate to charity [Kessef Mishneh; Ramah (Yoreh De’ah 240:5)]. The Ramah adds that if the person has ample resources, he should be cursed if he sustains his father from money for charity.

See Hilchot Talmud Torah 5:8 which states that all the services a servant performs for his master must be performed by a student for his teacher.

See ibid.:7 which states that a person must stand in his teacher’s presence from the time he sees him until he passes from his vision.

Even though that would have been appropriate as a mark of deference because he is his teacher. The Radbaz questions this ruling, stating that seemingly, out of respect for his Torah knowledge, the father should show the son this mark of deference and thus they should both stand for each other. This is the position taken by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:7).

By making such statements, he enhances his father’s prestige. Conversely, if he is unsure of whether speaking in the name of his father will not produce such positive results - and certainly if he is certain that it will not - he may or should make the request in his own name [Rashi (Kiddushin 32b); Siftei Cohen 240:8-9].

I.e., may any misfortune to be visited upon him in the spiritual realms be visited upon me.

After twelve months, however, this is unnecessary, for our Sages say that even the wicked are not judged in Gehinnom for longer than twelve months. Hence, all retribution will have already been visited upon him (Kessef Mishneh).

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:9) states that one should say: “May his memory be blessed.” The Turei Zahav 240:13 states that a combination of both expressions should be used.

Kiddushin 30b derives this concept from the fact that the command to fear one’s parents uses a plural verb, implying both a man and a woman.

I.e., her first obligation is to her husband.
Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:17) states that a woman is not obligated to honor her father while she is married for this reason. One might infer that she is liable to fear him even when married.

Or if her husband consents (Siftei Cohen 240:19).

Our translation is based on the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. The standard printed text is slightly different.

The Rambam’s words are taken from Kiddushin 32a. The commentaries have questioned this ruling, for as stated above, a son is not obligated to suffer financial loss in order to honor his father. Indeed, Kiddushin, loc. cit., speaks of the purse as belonging to the father, explaining that although the son is fit to inherit that purse, since the money is presently his father’s, the son may not protest. Implied is that if the purse is the son’s, he may.
The Kessef Mishneh explains that although he is not obligated to honor his father with his own funds, he must sacrifice all the money in the world not to cause him discomfort. The Tur and the Ramah (Yoreh Deah 240:8) state that if the father has already thrown the purse into the sea, the son must remain silent. Before he throws it, however, the son may try to prevent him from doing so. The Bayit Chadash and the Siftei Cohen 240:11 state that the son may sue the father for any loss he causes him. Hence, he may not embarrass him for causing him that loss.

The Rambam’s words are taken from Kiddushin 31a which cites the example of a gentile in Ashkelon who conducted himself in this manner. Our Sages explain that, in this regard, he should be looked up to as an exemplar.

I.e., by presenting extensive demands, he may cause them to transgress and spurn the mitzvah. The Kessef Mishneh implies that this law is the Rambam’s own deduction which he derived from the following halachah.

And thus a son will not be punished for failing to show the required honor; the son nevertheless fulfills a mitzvah by doing so (Radbaz, Vol. I, Responsum 524).

We have translated the term gadol according to its usual halachic meaning. The Ramah (Yoreh Deah 240:20) interprets this as referring to a son who has reached the age of 22 or 24.

As the Rambam explains in Hilchot Rotzeach 12:14, this command is interpreted as meaning, "Do not cause the spiritually blind to transgress." In this instance, by hitting his son after he has reached adulthood, the father is provoking him to perhaps respond in kind or to dishonor him in some way.

And heal them.

The Rambam’s ruling is based on a narrative in Kiddushin 31 b which relates how Rav Assi cared for his senile mother.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam’s ruling, maintaining that if a son will not care for his parents, no one else will. The Radbaz supports the Rambam’s ruling, explaining that the parents will take advantage of the child’s obligation to respect them and make no effort to control their behavior. Other people, by contrast, will rebuke the parents severely and rather than suffer such rebuke, they will control themselves. (See, however, the Turei Zahav who offers a different interpretation of the Ra’avad’s position.)

A person born out of an incestuous or an adulterous relationship.

For as reflected in the notes to Chapter 5, Halachah 12, a person is liable for striking and cursing his parents only when they are observant. And hence, until the father repents, the son is not liable for execution for his deeds. He is nevertheless forbidden to conduct himself in this manner (Radbaz).

For rebuking his fathers in this manner would cause him aggravation (Kiddushin 32a).
From this ruling, the Radbaz states that it would appear that one is obligated to honor one’s parents, even if they are transgressors. He notes, however, that (as the Hagahot Maimomiot question), Bava Metzia 62a appears to imply that if a person’s father died without repenting, one is not obligated to honor him. Hence the Radbaz explains that the passage in Bava Metzia, is speaking about a situation in which the person already died. We, by contrast, are speaking about an instance when the father is alive and there is hope that he will repent. Hence, throughout his lifetime, while there is still hope that he will repent, his son is obligated to honor him.
In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo offers a different resolution from which it appears that even if the father died without repenting, his sons are obligated to honor him, and he follows this understanding in his Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:18). The Ramah differs, stating that unless the father has repented, his son is not obligated to honor him during his lifetime. He may not, however, cause him aggravation.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:11) quotes these words and continues: “In this manner, he will understand on his own, without being embarrassed.”

From this statement, the Radbaz derives the ruling that a person is not considered wicked - in which instance, the son would not be obligated to heed his father at all - from merely making undesirable statements. To be placed in that category, he must perform an act of transgression.

For ultimately, the obligation to heed Rabbinic Law is a Scriptural command (Kessef Mishneh).

This is speaking about a mitzvah whose observance cannot be delayed, e.g., the burial of a corpse. If the observance of the mitzvah can be delayed, one should honor one's parents and then observe the mitzvah [Kessef Mishneh; Ramah (Yoreh Dea'ah 240: 12)].

If, however, he had already begun the performance of the other mitzvah, he should complete it before concerning himself with his father’s honor. For a person involved in the observance of one mitzvah is not obligated in others [Kessef Mishneh; Ramah (Yoreh Dea’ah 240:12)].

Honoring one’s father.

As Pe’ah 1:1 states: “Torah study surpasses all [other mitzvot].” Megilah 16b gives an example of the relationship of Torah study to the mitzvah of honoring one’s parents, stating that Jacob was punished for the 22 years in which he did not honor his father while he sojourned in Charan and tarried on the way. Although before that Jacob spent 14 years studying the Torah - and during this time, he also did not honor his father - he was not held liable for that, because “Torah study surpasses honoring one’s parents.”

See Hilchot Ishut 15:20 which states that a woman is obligated to honor her husband “exceedingly.” The Radbaz emphasizes that if the couple are divorced, the father receives no priority over the mother. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:14) also quotes this understanding, stating that in such a situation the son may honor whomever he desires first.

The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 240:21) states that even though there is no obligation for a son to continue to honor his step-mother after his father’s death, it is proper for him to do so. The commentaries note that this ruling appears to be based on the words of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi who, at the time of his death, instructed his sons to continue to honor their step-mother (Ketubot 103a).

In his gloss to Sefer HaMitzvot, the Megilat Esther states that from the fact that the Rambam does not qualify this ruling by stating that it applies only during the father’s lifetime, we can conclude that it applies even after his death.