Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 315) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 69) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

The verse uses the word Elohim which can also be interpreted as a reference to the Almighty. Nevertheless, Sanhedrin 66a states that in this instance, the reference is to a mortal judge.
In Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 60), the Rambam notes that this verse is also used as one of the sources for the prohibition against cursing God. Nevertheless, the verse is not considered as a prohibition of a general nature, because a specific punishment is mentioned for the latter transgression. See also the gloss of Rabbi Akiva Eiger which cites a similar issue.
The Tumim (Choshen Mishpat 2) states that the term Elohim refers to a judge possessing the unique semichah passed down from master to disciple originating with Moses. Hence this law does not apply in the present age when our judges no longer possess such a semichah.

The term nasi can have both these connotations. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 316) states that it refers to a person “in whom authority is vested and who is on the highest level, whether with regard to civic authority or Torah authority.”

Sefer HaMitzvot (Ibid.) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 71) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

Or even oneself (Halachah 3). One is, however, not liable for cursing a gentile (Sofrim 4:9). The Radbaz and the Hagahot Maimoniot also cite Bava Kama 94b which states that one is liable only for cursing an observant Jew.

The punishment given for the violation of a negative commandment (see Chapter 18, Halachah 2). Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 317) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 231) count the prohibition against cursing a fellow Jew as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

These transgressions are cumulative as stated in the following halachah.

Sefer HaMitzvot (Ibid.) states that we take into consideration, “not only the situation of the person being cursed, but also that of the one pronouncing the curse. He was warned not to arouse his soul towards revenge or to habituate it towards anger.”

This expression introduces a law derived by the Rambam through his process of deduction for which he has no explicit prior source in the Rabbinic literature.

The Kessef Mishneh cites Bava Kama 86b which states that one is liable for shaming a minor. Accordingly, one is also liable for cursing him. The Kessef Mish11eh also notes that the Tur (Choshen Mishpat 27) quotes the Mishneh Torah as stating that a person who curses a person who is sleeping is liable. This, the Kessef Mishneh maintains, is the proper version of this halachah.

The Sifra derives this concept from the exegesis of Leviticus, loc. cit.. Although one is not liable for cursing a deceased person, it is forbidden to do so [Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 27:2)].

Our translation follows the authoritative manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah. There is a printing error in the standard published text.

See Hilchot Mamrim 5:1-4 for a description of this prohibition.

The term “Take heed” is understood as implying a negative commandment (Sh’vuot 36b).

See Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 6:2 which lists the seven names of God.
The Ra’avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that one is liable for punishment only when one issues a curse using God’s ineffable name, Y-H-V-H. Although his statements appear to be based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Sh’vuot 4:10), it is possible to explain that those statements refer to a son’s cursing of his parents. He is liable for execution, only when he uses God’s ineffable name (Radbaz).

Although lashes are not given, it is forbidden to curse a colleague even without using God's name [Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 27:2)]. If the court desires, they may decree a suitable punishment (Halachah 5).

Thus if one utters a curse in English, using the name God, one is liable.

I.e., depending on the circumstance it is used.

See Chapter 15, Halachah 4. The Kessef Mishneh explains that since cursing is unique in that it is one of the few prohibitions for which one is liable for lashes although one does not perform a deed, one might think that a warning is also not required. Alternatively, since a person issues a curse in anger, one might think that a warning is not necessary, because it would go unheeded regardless.

Issuing such a curse is, however, forbidden [Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.)].

I.e., he issues the curse in one of the ways that is not punishable by lashes.

I.e., in addition to the ban of ostracism; alternatively, if he would look at the ban of ostracism lightly, but would suffer from the beating, we give him the beating (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 27:9).

See Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:11-12 which states that a person who disgraces a sage is fined a litra of gold. Moreover, he will receive punishment in the afterlife, and will be denied a portion in the world-to-come. See also Hilchot Chovel UMazik 3:5.

Hilchot Chovel UMazik, Ibid.

This refers to a nasi who is the head of the Talmudic academy (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 6:6). A king, by contrast, may not waive the respect due him and must zealously protect his honor. See Hilchot Melachim 2:5-6.

For it is not the person’s individual honor alone that is involved. What is of concern is the violation of the Torah’s commandments. And that, no mortal has the right to forgo (Kessef Mishneh). The Or Sameach brings support for this concept, noting that a person who curses himself is punished by lashes (Halachah 3). Now this person would surely forgo the affront to his honor rather than receive the lashes. Nevertheless, he is lashed, because he violated the Torah’s prohibitions. Similarly, when the curse is directed to another person, that person does not have the power to absolve him from punishment.

The Kessef Mishneh states that the Rambam’s wording implies that when a person is obligated to be placed under a ban of ostracism for offending a sage, if that sage does not forgive him, he must be placed under that ban even if he repents and expresses regret for his actions publicly.

Kiddushin 32b relates that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha summoned a person to him three times and that person did not come. He then sent him a message: “Were it not that I had never placed a person under a ban of ostracism, I certainly would have placed you under such a ban.”
See Hilchot Talmud Torah 7:13: “Although a sage has license to place a person under a ban of ostracism, because of [an affront to] his honor, it is not praiseworthy for a Torah scholar to act in this manner.... This was the practice of the pious men of the previous generations. They would hear their shame, but they would not reply. Moreover, they would pardon and forgive the person who insulted them.”

As Hilchot Talmud Torah, Ibid. continues: “When does the above apply? When [the person] disgraced or embarrassed [the sage] in private. If he disgraced or embarrassed the sage in public, it is forbidden for the sage to waive [the affront to] his honor... because the disrespect of the Torah is involved.”

For abandoning the Torah’s court system is a repudiation of God who structured it.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 26:1) states that this applies even if both litigants are willing to have the case tried in the gentile court. The Ramah states that if a plaintiff brought a case against a fellow Jew to a gentile court, the Jewish court should place him under a ban of ostracism until he withdraws the claim from the gentile court.

Thus even in the present day when there are just gentile courts, complaints should be brought to a Rabbinic judge and not to them.