Rambam - 1 Chapter a Day

For that is forbidden. under all circumstances as stated in Chapter 20, Halachah 6.
See also Hilchot Teshuvah 4:3 which states that taking a bribe to pervert judgment is one of the transgressions for which it is impossible to achieve full-hearted repentance.
When a person receives payment - or even a favor - from another person, he will be predisposed to support him in his claim. We are not speaking necessarily about a conscious desire to act on that person’s behalf. Instead, the intent is that in the judge’s unconscious - in his cognitive processes over which he does not usually exercise control - there will be a motivation to help his benefactor. This is. the rationale for all the stringencies the Rambam mentions in Halachah 3.

Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 274) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 83) count this as one of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.

As a source, the commentaries cite I Samuel 12:3 which relates that Samuel told the people: “From whom have I taken money that I will turn my eyes away from him? [Tell me,] and I will make restitution.” See also the Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 83) who writes that even if the giver does not demand restitution, the judge is obligated to return it.

As the Rambam states in Hilchot Rotzeach 12:14, this prohibition forbids placing moral stumbling blocks in a person’s path.

I.e., even though he does not take the profit for himself, causing his attendants to be rewarded is also considered as resembling receiving bribery.

Shabbat 56a offers this interpretation of Scripture’s words of censure.

We have offered an interpretation of the Hebrew term devarim that fits the examples cited by the Rambam. It must, however, be noted that the term devarim can also be interpreted as meaning “words.” The Sefer Me’irat Einayim 9:4 explains that words- e.g., giving a judge a greeting when one would not ordinarily do so, praising him, or speaking on his behalf - can also be considered a bribe, just as it can be considered as interest (see Hilchot Malveh ViLoveh 5:12).

All these examples are cited in Ketubot 105b. The Kessef Mishneh states that according to the Rambam, all the examples that follow reflect conduct mandated by law. They are not merely illustrations of pious behavior that would be desirable to emulate, as suggested by Tosafot, Sanhedrin 8a.

E.g., Terumah, the offering of grain given to the priests, challah, a portion of dough, or the first of a sheep’s shearings. See Hilchot Bikkurim, Ch. 1, where the 24 presents given the priests are mentioned.

We fear that the fact that the judge borrowed from the lender will cause him to feel indebted to him and hence - knowingly or unknowingly - show favoritism to him.
The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 9:1) states that this applies in a situation when the judge borrows from the person frequently. Borrowing from him only on occasion is not considered a significant enough factor to have him disqualified as a judge.

Thus there is no sense of the judge being indebted to the lender. For one favor will be repaid by another favor.

He may, however, accept a wage for negotiating a compromise (Siftei Cohen 9:7).

I.e., not only the judgment for which he took a wage, but all of his previous judgments are also nullified (Rabbenu Nissim in his gloss to Kiddushin, Ch. 2). The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 9:5) quotes this concept as law.

Compare to Hilchot Gezelah ViA vedah 12:4.

Ketubot 105a cites the examples of the Sages Karna and Rav Huna who would conduct themselves in this manner.
In his gloss to Hilchot Talmud Torah 3:10, the Kessef Mishneh states that if the judge has no profession other than this, he may be paid a salary. For were he not to accept work as a judge, he would have to find another profession. On the basis of this rationale, from the Talmudic age onward, communities have paid judges salaries from communal funds even though the judges have no other professions.

For if one pays the judge outside the other’s presence, the other litigant may think that the one paid the other more as a bribe. Alternatively, the one paying may think that the judge is taking payment only from him (Kessef Mishneh).

The Radbaz states that from the Talmudic sources (Ketubot 105b; Sanhedrin 27b), it appears that although it is forbidden for a judge to adjudicate such cases, if he violates this prohibition and acts as a judge, his judgment is binding. He maintains that the Rambam’s linking of this issue with bribery indicates, however, that he maintains that the judgment is unacceptable. This is also indicated by the Rambam’s wording in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Sanhedrin 3:5). The Beit Yosef and the Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 7:7), however, follow the initial view.

It was customary for a person to invite his closest friends to share in his wedding celebrations with him. See Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah, ch. 7, where the Aramaic term the Rambam uses, shushvinin, is discussed.

The Bayit Chadash (Choshen Mishpat 8) rules that if the two judges truly hate each other, the judgment is not binding, even after the fact.

The Rambam follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi’s version of Sanhedrin 7a. The standard printed text follows a slightly different version.

The sword refers to retribution that is exacted in this world, and Hell to retribution exacted in the world to come (Sefer Me’irat Einayim 8:7-8).

For every Jew has a soul which is an actual part of God.

This was part of the charge King Yehoshafat administered to the judges whom he appointed.

I.e., even if the litigant is a person of stature, the judge must regard him with suspicion and scrutinize his statements carefully.

I.e., even when he holds a person liable, he should not view him as wicked, but rather a person who committed a misdeed inadvertently, for various reasons.